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The Convergence of Abortion
Regulation in Germany and the United
States: A Critique of Glendon's Rights
Talk Thesis
UDO WERNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (West German
Federal Constitutional Court or Constitutional Court) and the U.S.
Supreme Court issued almost diametrically opposed judgments on
the issue of abortion. In 1973's Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme
Court extended the right to privacy to a woman's right to termi-
nate a pregnancy.' Roegave women the right to decide during the
first trimester whether to bring a pregnancy to term. The Court
allowed states to regulate abortion during the second and third
trimesters to protect the woman's health.
Two years later, in 1975, the Constitutional Court struck down
the Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (Abortion Reform Act of
1974 or 1974 Reform Act), that decriminalized abortion.2 Holding
that the state has a duty to take affirmative action to protect the
life of the fetus, the court re-established punishment for abortion
except under a set of special justifications.
The radically different outcomes of the two decisions aroused
the interest of many scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. One
of the most recognized comparativists of European and U.S. law is
Mary Ann Glendon, a professor at Harvard Law School. Her
book, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, 3 compares the U.S.
* Rechtsreferendar at District Court of Gbrlitz, Germany. MPA, Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, 1995; German law exam, 1993; Friedrich Schiller
University of Jena. I grew up in Zittau, former East Germany.
1. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
2. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BverfG, 39 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [BxerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.).
3. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
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and German approaches to abortion. Glendon argues that the
German communitarian conception of law was superior to Roe in
its approach to regulating abortion because Roe focused too much
on a woman's rights to privacy and autonomy.
In a slightly different context, Glendon took up the issue again
in 1991. In Rights Talk, she describes the U.S. legal discourse as
characterized, in part, by "hyperindividualism." 4 Glendon argues
that individual rights dominate U.S. society "from the top to the
bottom" while German law emphasizes social dimensions in which
individual rights exist for society's benefit.5
One year after the publication of Rights Talk, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided on the constitutionality of various
provisions of a Pennsylvania abortion statute. In Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey6, the Supreme Court
substituted an "undue burden" framework for Roe's trimester-
viability solution, opening a new path for state regulation of
abortion.
One year later, the Constitutional Court declared the
Schwangeren und Familienhilfegesetz (Pregnancy and Family
Assistance Act of 1992 or Assistance Act) unconstitutional and
void because it did not criminalize abortion throughout pregnan-
cy.7 While the judgment, in general, stigmatized abortion as
illegal, it nevertheless allowed renunciation of criminal punishment
for abortions obtained during the first three months of pregnancy.'
This Article examines Glendon's argument that the legal
dialogue in the United States is far more preoccupied by individual
"rights talk" than the society-conscious German approach to
regulating abortion. Analyzing U.S. and German abortion
decisions in the 1970s and 1990s shows the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions reflect more societal consciousness than Glendon admits.
Furthermore, the language of the German judgments is more
influenced by "rights talk" and competing individual interests than
Glendon argues. The 1993 Constitutional Court judgment and
Casey signal a development of abortion regulation in both
countries that reflects a convergence rather than divergence.
4. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTs TALK 75 (1991).
5. Id. at 12, 73-74.
6. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
7. Judgment of May 28, 1993, BverfG, 88 BVerfGE 203-205 (F.R.G.).
8. Id. at 296-97.
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Part II of this Article describes the central argument of
Glendon's Rights Talk with respect to abortion. Parts III and IV
analyze Roe and Casey and the German decisions on abortion in
light of Glendon's main thesis. Part V shows how abortion
regulation in the United States and Germany have converged
toward a position that balances both state interests and individual
rights. Part VI concludes that U.S. and German abortion law is
becoming convergent.
IT. GLENDON'S RIGHTS TALK AND ABORTION
According to Glendon's central thesis in Rights Talk, life in
contemporary United States has become a vast school of law where
social relationships are expressed almost exclusively in the language
of rights. In a special reading of Tocquevile, she analyzes the
legalistic culture of the United States.' By the middle of the
twentieth century, the average U.S. citizen had firsthand contact
with the legal system: divorce became a mass phenomenon, more
citizens were eligible for jury service, and lawyers were consulted
to settle estates or to make wills.'" The law increasingly ex-
pressed and carried the comm6n values of U.S. society." Conse-
quently, legal terms today pervade both political and popular
discourse in the United States; almost every controversy is framed
as a clash of rights.'2
While Glendon acknowledges that U.S. influence after World
War II spread this rights discourse throughout the world, she
argues that the U.S. language of legal disputes is different from its
modem European counterparts. In its simplistic U.S. form, the
legal dispute knows no compromise: "The winner takes all and the
loser has to get out of town. The conversation is over."'" In its
absoluteness, Glendon argues U.S. rights talk promotes conflict and
"sporadic crisis intervention over systemic preventive measures"
and "particular interests over the common good."'" Glendon also
argues that rights talk inhibits dialogue that might result in a
consensus that balances competing values.' 5
9. GLENDON, supra note 4, at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 3-4.
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id. at 14-15.
15. Id.
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'Citing the U.S. Supreme Court, which once referred to
citizenship as "the right to have rights,"' 6 Glendon further
concludes that individual rights dominate the notion of citizenship
in the U.S. system."t In contrast, the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man and Citizen emphasizes rights in conjunction with
the duties of individuals.'8 The Romano-German legal tradition
incorporated the ideas of Kant and Rousseau to the philosophy of
natural rights developed by Hobbes and Locke; it does not restrict
legal disputes to individual rights but includes communitarian
values.' 9 Glendon, therefore, believes that the discourse about
the idea of civil society in Europe is less rights-centered and
individualistic than in the United States. Glendon misses in U.S.
society the vision of a republic where citizens are not only bearers
of rights but actively take "responsibility for maintaining a vital
political life."2
In chapter three of Rights Talk, subtitled "The Lone Rights
Bearer," Glendon prominently relates her main argument to the
issue of abortion. Roe v. Wade, according to Glendon, focused
simply on the privacy and autonomy of the individual woman
instead of emphasizing the social interrelationships of the pregnant
woman and the unborn fetus within the larger community.2' In
her view, the Supreme Court failed to moderate the clash between
a woman's right to freedom from state interference and the value
of unborn life. As a result, Glendon concludes, the Court
established an absolute right to abortion, and the pregnant woman
was left as the lone rights-bearer.' While the woman was free to
decide whether to have an abortion, she was also left helpless and
isolated in her privacy.'
Glendon believes that the German approach to abortion, as
contained in the 1975 judgment of the Constitutional Court, differs
substantially from Roe.24 While U.S. constitutional law defines
the right to privacy as the "right to be let alone,"' Article 2(1) of
16. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
17. GLENDON, supra note 4, at 11-12.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 68-69.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 58-60.
22. Id. at 59.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 64.
25, See id. at 61.
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the Grundgesetz (Constitution or Basic Law of Germany) provides
a right to personality in the context of society: "Everyone shall
have the right to free development of his personality in so far as he
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the
constitutional order or against morality.
2 6
The principle of Article 2(1) of the Basic Law is an individual-
istic one that protects "the inner sphere of personality which is in
principle subject only to the free determination of the individu-
al."'27 The text of the Basic Law, however, constrains the right of
personality in relation to the rights of others, the constitutional
order, and the moral code. "The concept of man in the Basic Law
is not of an isolated, sovereign individual; rather, the Basic Law
resolves the conflict between the individual and the community by
relating and binding the citizen to the community, but without
detracting from his individuality. 28 Thus, the Basic Law forced
the Constitutional Court to pay attention to the social dimension
of the abortion issue.
Glendon emphasizes that the social dimension of the individu-
al was not neglected in the ruling of the Constitutional Court but
was clearly overlooked in Roe.29 The Supreme Court framed the
abortion issue "as pitting two interests against each other in an all-
or-nothing contest."3 In contrast, the Constitutional Court did
not rest its decision on the fetus' right to life or on the woman's
personal liberty rights. 31 The German court balanced the conflict-
ing interests between the right to personality and the constitutional
value of life, paying attention to the principle priority of the latter
over personality rights.
32
Glendon is convinced that the German decision of 1975
allowed for a compromise that resulted in a better solution than
26. GRUNDOESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 2, para. 1 (F.R.G.) (official translation of
the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) as provided by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Unless otherwise quoted, all translations from the German text are the author's.
27. Judgment of Feb. 14, 1958, BGH, 26 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 349, 354. Translated by author.
28. GLENDON, supra note 4, at 71 (quoting Federal Constitutional Court decision of
July 7, 1970, translated in Donald P. Kommers, Liberty and Community in Constitutional
Law: The Abortion Cases in Comparative Perspective, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 371, 403
(1985)).
29. Id. at 73.
30. ld. at 64.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 65.
1996] 575
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that in the United States. According to Glendon, the statute
adopted by the West German Parliament as a result of the
Constitutional Court's judgment recognized the moral significance
of the abortion question for society while allowing for abortions in
cases of absolute necessity.33 In contrast, the Supreme Court took
a rigid "rights talk" approach that resulted in the precedent of a
woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
Thus, Glendon concludes, the image of the lone rights-bearer "has
predisposed" U.S. society "to an unnecessarily isolating version of
privacy." 4 Too much rights talk and too little societal conscious-
ness in the United States prevented the Supreme Court from
resolving the conflict between the individual (the woman) and the
communitarian value (the unborn life) by relating it to the
community. In other words, Glendon complains that individual
rights influence the U.S. legal language much more than the
communitarian values that influence the German system.35
The following sections question the issue of abortion as
utilized by Glendon to support her main argument in Rights Talk.
The core of this Article's criticism relies on arguments drawn from
the language of these courts.
III. THE RECOGNITION OF SOCIAL VALUES IN THE ABORTION
DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT-THE STATES'
INTERESTS IN CHILDBIRTH
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court on abortion laws since Roe v. Wade caused intense
social controversies in the United States.36 This public debate
gained a new legal landmark with Planned Parenthood of
33. Id. at 65. Glendon, in fact, misinterprets the West German 1976 Abortion Reform
Act. A woman did not have the ultimate choice whether to bring the pregnancy to term
after she underwent the counseling, procedure. Rather, the doctor must confirm the
existence of a serious hardship to allow for legal abortion. § 218(a) StGB (translated in
Elizabeth J. Kapo, Abortion Law Reform: The Nexus Between Abortion and the Role of
Women in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 137, 152 n.95). What Glendon describes is actually the counseling model
incorporated into the 1974 Abortion Reform Act, which was declared unconstitutional and
void. Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in Germany: Should
Americans Pay Attention?, 10 CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 7.
34. GLENDON, supra note 4, at 67.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 57.
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,37 which made important
alterations to Roe.
A. Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court expanded the right to
privacy to include the right to obtain an abortion. 8 The language
of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to
privacy. In Griswold v.- Connecticut, the Supreme Court first
articulated a constitutionally protected right to privacy in reproduc-
tive choices. 9 The Court "inferred this right [to privacy] from
various provisions of the Bill of Rights and found it applicable to
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."40 This decision, however, relies on the historical
context of the document, rather than the text of the Bill of Rights
itself.
In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that the sphere of privacy
protected from state interference includes a "woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."4" The fetus could
not hold individual rights that would compete with the woman's
right to privacy because the Roe Court did not consider the fetus
a person 2
The Court also found that "the pregnant woman cannot be
isolated in her privacy" as she "carries an embryo and, later, a
fetus."'4  It, however, did consider the social dimensions of
childbirth. The majority concluded that the state maintains two
important interests: the health of the mother and the potential
human life." The Court reasoned that a "woman's privacy is no
longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly."45  The state must show a compelling
interest to interfere with a woman's right to privacy.46 The
37. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40. Florian Miedel, Is West Germany's 1975 Decision a Solution to the American
Abortion Debate? A Critique of Mary Ann Glendon and Donald Kommers, 20 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 471,491-92 (1993).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
42. Id. at 158.
43. Id. at 159.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 162.
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majority placed varying values on the competing interests of the
state and the woman. In the first trimester, a woman's right
remained untouched. In the second trimester, the state could
regulate abortion only to protect the woman's health. In the last
trimester of pregnancy, however, the Court allowed the state to
"go so far as to proscribe abortion" to realize its interest in
protecting fetal life.47 The Court created an exception for threats
to the life or health of the mother.'
In summary, the Roe Court balanced the different interests
involved. 9 Hence, Roe is not "the winner takes it all" type of
ruling that Glendon suggests. Rather, the Court observed the
interests of the community by acknowledging the state's interest in
the protection of an unborn life as it competes with a woman's
right to privacy. The voice of the unborn, however, was not strong
enough to be heard during the first two trimesters of pregnancy.
The protection of fetal life had to yield to a woman's right to
privacy, but it was not totally neglected as Glendon believes.
Despite increasing dissent, the Court reaffirmed the central
holding of Roe v. Wade several times during the 1970s and
1980s." The Court declared state laws unconstitutional whenever
they infringed upon a woman's right to have an abortion. In 1989,
however, the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri law that restricted
abortions in publicly funded institutions. The Missouri statute,
challenged in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, declared that
the "life of each human being begins at conception.""1 The Court
emphasized that Roe never implied a limitation on state authority
to make its own value judgment with respect to abortion. 2
The reasoning of Webster, and the plurality's attack on Roe
and its trimester framework, contained the seeds for more
restrictive state abortion laws. In 1992, the Court assessed the first
of these laws in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey.
53 '
47. Id. at 163.
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id. at 165.
50. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63
(1976); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986).
51. 492 U.S. 490, 504 (1989).
52. Id. at 506.
53. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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B. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
The Pennsylvania law at issue in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey contained five requirements
before a woman could legally obtain an abortion:
1. a woman seeking an abortion must give her informed
consent prior to the procedure;
2. she must be provided with certain information at least
twenty-four hours before the abortion;
3. a minor must obtain parental consent unless a judicial
bypass is granted;
4. a married woman seeking an abortion must notify her
husband of her intended abortion; and
5. facilities providing abortion services must satisfy
certain reporting requirements.-
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of all these
provisions except spousal notification. While the majority
reaffirmed Roe's central holding that the state may not interfere
with the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy before
viability, the Court abandoned the trimester system and applied an
"undue burden" test to balance the interests involved.55
The Court still chose viability as the point where the state's
interest in childbirth begins to compete successfully with a woman's
right to privacy.56  Unlike the strict trimester approach, the
ambiguous viability concept now offers the state increased
opportunities to regulate abortion. Casey stated that a woman's
constitutional freedom is not so unlimited as to prevent the state
from promoting its interest in unborn life and, after viability; from
restricting the right to abortion. Casey, therefore, puts more
emphasis on the social value of the developing life than Roe.
Indeed, the Casey. Court.reasoned that Roe's trimester framework
had undervalued the state's interest in potential life. A law that
decreases the practical availability of abortion, the Court further
ruled, is valid as long as it does not impose an undue burden on a
woman's choice to obtain an abortion."
54. Id. at 2833-37. See also Miedel, supra note 40, at 494.
55. Casey, 112 S. CL at 2818, 2819.
56. Id. at 2816.
57. Id. at 2818.
58. Id. at 2819.
1996] 579
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Thus, in Casey, the "undue burden" analysis became the
standard to reconcile the state's interests with a woman's right.
Applying this standard, the Court upheld the counseling procedure
of the Pennsylvania law, which required the woman to receive
information about available assistance for childbirth or social
support twenty-four hours prior to the abortion. According to the
Court, this provision was not unduly burdensome because Roe had
not established an unrestricted right to abortion. 9
The language of Casey does not support Glendon's argument
of pure rights talk without the recognition of social values in
contemporary United States.60 The majority opinion repeatedly
explains that the right to privacy is not to be overstated with
respect to abortion. Rather, the Court paved the way for increased
state activity to promote its interest in childbirth, which Glendon
considers the dominating social value at stake in the abortion
discussion.
One can argue, of course, that Casey was the result of
President Ronald Reagan's appointment of conservative Justices to
the Supreme Court. The new justices replaced those who had
contributed to the majority of the Roe decision.6' Such an
argument, however, leads to three critiques of Glendon's analysis
in Rights Talk. First, does the degree of consciousness for social
values in a society depend on the language of majority opinions of
constitutional courts? Second, what role should dissenting opinions
play in the analysis? Finally, at which level do we "measure" the
existence of too much rights talk and too little protection of the
common good?
Since Roe, the Supreme Court has dealt with state abortion
laws for over two decades. If abortion restrictions represent the
protection of common values, as Glendon argues, then U.S. societal
consciousness exists at least at the state level. Glendon's analysis
with respect to abortion, however, focuses merely on decisions by
the Supreme Court. While the importance of these judgments is
certainly enormous within the U.S. judicial system, they do not
necessarily reflect the role of individualism and social relations in
59. Id. at 2826.
60. Of course, Casey came after Rights Talk As Glendon's thesis claims validity across
time, however, Glendon must accept the comparison of her main argument in respect to
abortion with the Casey holding rendered only one year later.
61. See Miedel, supra note 40, at 493 n.168. -
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U.S. society in every respect. Even if one restricts the analysis of
rights talk to the language of the German and U.S. decisions on
abortion by the federal constitutional courts, Glendon overempha-
sizes the lack of communitarian values in U.S. case law. Just as
Roe struck a balance across trimesters, the Supreme Court in Casey
developed a framework to balance the value of life, as represented
by the interests of the state in childbirth, with the right to privacy
of the pregnant woman. The next part contends that Glendon
underestimates the role of rights talk and individual rights in the
decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court.
IV. THE GERMAN DECISIONS ON ABORTION AND THE ROLE
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Conseqient to World War II and German Unification, the
decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court on abortion
contain important reflections on the history of abortion regulation
and individual rights in Germany. Analysis of the German
judgments, therefore, requires a brief look at the historical
development and discussion of the abortion issue in Germany
before turning to the question of rights talk in the language of the
decisions.
A. The 1975 Decision of the Constitutional Court
1. Prior to the 1975 Decision
With the end of Nazi Germany in 1945 came the repudiation
of the Nazi law on abortion. The medizinische Indikation,
judgemade law of medical indication developed by the
Reichsgerichtshof (Supreme Court) in 1927, regained force.62 It
did not punish women if the termination of pregnancy was the only
means to avoid danger to the mother's life. The 1962 government
draft of a new Das erste Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts (West
German Criminal Code) endorsed this judge-made law. Mean-
while, the medical indication test in practice became responsive to
social change.63 The number of legal abortions increased from
2858 in 1968 to 17,814 in 1974. The number of persons convicted
62. Albin Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First Experiences, 34 AM. J. COMP.
LAW 369, 371 (1986).
63. d.
19961
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for illegal abortions dropped from 596 to 94.'
Changed attitudes favorable to legalizing abortion in socialist
countries, as well as in Scandinavia, fostered a discussion in West
Germany that focused on the Fristenlosung (periodic model) versus
the Indikationslksung (indication model).65 In 1970, Swiss and
German criminal law professors released an alternative draft to the
1962 proposal of the German government.' Although in
agreement with the basic objectives of reform, the panel of
professors disagreed on whether the decision to have an abortion
should be left to the woman.67
The majority of these so-called "alternative professors"
favored a periodic model.6' They suggested legalizing abortion
for the first trimester of pregnancy if the woman had consulted a
counseling service. Counseling was designed to discourage
abortion and to limit it to cases of necessity.69 The indication
solution, on the other hand, allowed for abortion "when the
carrying to term of the pregnancy cannot be expected of the
mother considering all aspects of her situation," including social
reasons.
70
Both suggestions shaped the discussion on abortion that
culminated in a fierce parliamentary battle over the 1974 Reform
Act, which was based on the periodic solution.7 During the first
stage of pregnancy, termination was at the discretion of the woman
but still illegal if she had not followed a consulting procedure.
During the second trimester, abortion was legal in cases of medical
necessity or to avoid the birth of a seriously defective child. Both
exceptions were subject to mandatory certification.72
The German Parliament passed the 1974 Reform Act with 247
votes in favor, 233 against, and 9 abstentions.' Even before the
1974 Reform Act came into force, the Christian Democrat
64. Id.
65. Id. at 371-73.
66. Michael G. Mattern, German Abortion Law: The Unwanted Child of Reunification,
13 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 643, 658 (1991).
67. See Eser, supra note 62, at 372.
68. Id. at 373.
69. See Mattern, supra note 66, at 658.
70. Id. at 658, citing J. BAUMANN, ALTERNATIVE DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE FOR THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY § 106 I (J. Darby trans. 1977).
71. Kommers, supra note 33, at 4-5.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 4.
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opposition, as well as five Qerman states74 petitioned the
Constitutional Court for a ruling on its -constitutionality.75 They
claimed that the 1974 Reform Act violated Article 2(2) of the Basic
Law, which stated that "everyone has the right to life and to the
inviolability of his person."7 6 They claimed that the state failed
to maintain its obligation to sufficiently protect the unborn life.
The Constitutional Court eventually supported the claim and
declared the 1974 Reform Act unconstitutional and void."7
2. The Reasoning of the Court
With three of eight judges dissenting, the First Senate of the
Constitutional Court handed down its decision on February 25,
1975. The court based its judgment mainly .on Article 1, which
stated that "[T]he dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority," and, on
Article 2, sentence 1, of the Basic Law.7' The opinion addressed
the following topics: (1) the legal status of the fetus; .(2) the
obligation of the state to protect the unborn life; (3) the balance of
the rights of the fetus versus the rights of the woman; (4) justifica-
tion of abortion; and (5) criticism of the 1974 Reform Act.79
a. The Legal Status of the Fetus
First, the court recognized that Article 1 of the Basic Law, in
conjunction with Article 2, sentence 1, legally established the
fundamental value of human life in German law. The Basic Law
responded to Nazi policies by explicitly insuring the natural right
to life. These policies included the Vernichtung lebensunwerten
Lebens (destruction of unworthy life), Endlosung (final solution),
74. These are Baden-Wlrttemberg, Bavaria, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland and Schleswig-
Hohistein. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerG, 39 BVerfGE 1, 18 (F.R.G.).
75. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerfG, 39 BVerfGE at 18. Under German law, the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court may be invoked without an actual case. This test
on the constitutionality of an act or statute is known as abstrakte Normenkontrolle (abstract
judicial review) and stems directly from the Basic Law. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution]
[GG] art. 93, § 4 (F.R.G.). See also, DONALD P. KOMMERs, THE CONSTrUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 514 (1989).
76. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 2(2), (F.R.G.) (translated in Kapo, supra
note 33, at 151).
77. See 39 BVerfGE at 2.
78. Id. at 19-20.
79. Id. at 1.
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and Liquidierung (liquidation).' In light of the moral confronta-
tion with the previous Nazi regime, the court broadly interpreted
Article 2(1)."1 The court concluded that the term "everyone" in
this provision must include the fetus.' Parliamentary statements
of both supporters and opponents of the 1974 Reform Act
endorsed this point of view. 3 The court further held that,
according to common biological-physiological understanding, life
starts on the fourteenth day after conception and the development
of the fetus is a continuous process that does not distinguish
between individual stages of pregnancy.' Consequently, the
German court had to take into account the value of the unborn
life.85
b. The Obligation of the State to Protect Unborn Life
The Constitutional Court interpreted the Basic Law in light of
an objective hierarchy of values!.6 While the Basic Law grants
individual rights, it also embodies objective values that impose a
mandatory duty on the federal state to ensure their protection and
to maximize the public value.' Hence, constitutional rights not
only function as a protection against state interference but require
state action in order to protect the public values endorsed in the
Basic Law. The court concluded that the German state has an
affirmative obligation to protect the life of the fetus because the
value of human life crowns the hierarchy of objective values of the
Basic Law."8
The principle of objective values represents the creation of a
communitarian value structure. In this respect, Glendon's
argument of German individualism limited by social consciousness
seems to hold true. In contrast to Roe v. Wade, the German court
did not have to decide whether the fetus was already a bearer of
80. Id. at 36.
81. Id. at 36-37.
82. Id. at 37.
83. Id. at 38.
84. Id. at 37.
85. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade did not view the fetus as a person; thus, the
fetus did not have individual rights that would outweigh the woman's right to privacy. 410
U.S. 113, 158 (1973). Accordingly, the Supreme Court focused on the woman's right to
privacy as the core value in the Roe decision. Id. at 153.
86. 39 BVerfGE at 41.
87. See Kommers, supra note 33, at 9.
88. See 39 BVerfGE at 42.
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individual rights because the Basic Law protected the unborn life
as a value itself. Indeed, the court refused to make that decision:
[We] need not decide on the controversial question at iisue in
the present proceedings, as well as in the case law and scientific
literature, of whether the nasciturus itself is the bearer of basic
rights or whether, because its capacity to exercise legal and
constitutional rights is lacking, it is protected "only" by the
objective norms of the Constitution in its right to life. 9
The constitutional obligation of the state to protect unborn life
can already be deduced from the objective legal content of
constitutional norms.9 The judges wanted to avoid the difficult
question of who would assert the fetus' right. At the same time,
however, the Constitutional Court concluded that the Basic Law
protects gestating life as a legal value.9 The court's conclusion
does not deny a fetus' individual right to life. Indeed, the
qualification of the right to life as an objective, constitutional value
requires that every person, including the fetus, have an individual
right to life. Otherwise, this objective value would be an empty
shell. The language of the court supports this idea when the judges
address the fetus' "right to life."92
With respect to the outcome of the 1975 decision, it did not
matter whether the fetus was granted an individual right to life or
vas protected as an objective constitutional value. The decision of
the Constitutional Court did not rest on the superiority of objective
communitarian values over the woman's individual right of
personality. Rather, the right to life outweighs the woman's
interest.93 An ideal balance that would guarantee both the
protection of the nasciturus as well as the woman's freedom to
decide about the termination of pregnancy was impossible. Thus,
the court concluded, the objective hierarchy of values in the
German constitution commands that the fetus's right to life
outweighs the right to self-development." The solution would not
differ if the judges had assigned the fetus an individual right to life
that would have competed with the woman's individual rights.
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id. at 41-42.
91. Id.
92. d. at 41. The court explicitly formulated the unborn's individual right to life in
1993.
93. Id. at 43.
94. 1d
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c. The Balance of the Rights of the Fetus Versus the Rights of
the Woman
The court further held that Article 2(1) guards the right to
uninhibited personal development. A pregnancy is part of the
woman's right to privacy and falls under the protection of Article
2(1): "The right of the woman to freely develop her personali-
ty... that includes the self-responsibility to decide against
parenthood.., is entitled to recognition and protection."95
Because the fetus is not considered a part of the woman but a
separate human being, however, its right to life demands principal
priority over the woman's interest to choose her lifestyle freely.
A solution that guarantees the protection of the nasciturus' life
and grants the pregnant [woman] the right to freely decide on
the termination of her pregnancy the same time is impossi-
ble .... The required balancing therefore has to consider both
constitutional values in respect to their relations to the dignity
of man as the central value of the constitution ... (and) ... the
protection of the fetus' life is to be given priority ....
Thus, the state has no general power to balance the conflict of
rights and values in favor of the woman's freedom to develop her
personality.
Clearly, the Constitutional Court considered the woman's right
of personality as competing with the value of the fetus's life. The
latter, however, was not established as an absolute. The German
decision therefore contains more discussion of rights than its U.S.
counterpart in the sense that the Supreme Court did not take
account of any conflicting right of the fetus. The Constitutional
Court, in contrast, had to decide which right or value outweighs the
other. Thus, in Roe, the lack of individual rights of the fetus and
inadequate consideration of rights gave priority to a woman's right
to privacy; the German court, in contrast, engaged in a discourse
of individual rights versus objective values.
d. Justification of Abortion
The Constitutional Court, however, could not disregard the
changed reality of abortion practice. While the constitution
demanded that general abortion be illegal, the court acknowledged
95.Id.
96. Id.
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the necessity of abortions in circumstances where it would be
unreasonable to expect the woman to carry the pregnancy to
term.97
First, the court reconfirmed the constitutionality of the.medical
indication test, which had existed since the 1927 judgment of the
Reichsgerichtsho 98 This well-established exception recognized
the woman's own constitutionally guaranteed right to life and the
inviolability of the person:
The continuation of pregnancy is ... unreasonable... [if]
... the termination of pregnancy is required to protect the
pregnant woman from a threat to her life or a serious threat to
her health. In this case her own right to life and to physical
integrity (Article 2(1)) is at question, and [the woman] cannot
be expected to sacrifice this right for the unborn life.99
Second, the court reintroduced the "eugenic indication" test
for cases in which the examining physician confirmed that the fetus
is already incurably deformed or that an incurable birth defect is
more than likely.1"° Third, the court recognized a "criminological
indication," which allowed abortion when a pregnancy resulted
from criminal action, such as rape or sexual intercourse with a
minor.'°' Finally, the court recognized a Notlagenindikation
(social indication) exemption: "[T]he overall social situation of the
pregnant woman and her family can generate conflicts of such
magnitude that, beyond a certain limit, the measures of the
criminal law cannot force further sacrifice in favor of the unborn
life.'""° In every case, the stress on the woman must be so severe
that the denial of a termination would be unreasonable.
"[C]ircumstances must exist which impose extraordinary obstacles
[to bring the pregnancy to term], so that it cannot be expected to
97. Id. at 48.
98. Mattern, supra note 66, at 667.
99. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerG, 39 BVerfGE 1, 49 (F.R.G.).
100. Compare Mattern, supra note 66, at 667 with 39 BVerfGE at 49. "The court
recognized four such indications justifying non-criminal abortions): (1) the medical
indication; (2) the eugenic indication; (3) the criminological indication; and (4) the social
indication." Id
101. Mattern, supra note 66, at 668.
102. Eser, supra note 62, at 376 (translating 39 BverfGE at 50). The social indication,
intended to apply to cases of hardship, would in the following years experience such
widespread use that it was labelled a "hidden periodic model." Mattern, supra note 66, at
669.
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obey the legal duty [to give birth to the unborn].'
The language of the court reveals that the woman's own right
to life was important to justify the medical and social indications.
The use of the terms "unreasonable" and "sacrifice" signifies that
the court balanced the competing values or rights of the fetus and
the woman. Hence, individual rights determined the legal
discourse as Well as the result of the German abortion decision.
e. Criticism of the 1974 Reform Act
The Constitutional Court also faced the question of whether
the lack of criminalization of abortion during the first trimester of
a pregnancy violated the constitution because it found the state
responsible for insufficient protection of the unborn life. The court
stated that the sum of legal measures, criminal and civil, is the
decisive factor in determining if the fetus is adequately protect-
ed.t 4 The majority of the court found that the non-penalty
measures of the 1974 Reform Act would not sufficiently protect the
unborn life. Furthermore, the court criticized the Act for failing to
properly express the objective values of the Basic Law by generally
disapproving abortions." s
In summary, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the
German Constitution protects unborn life as an objective value."°
To allow for the establishment of the fetus's life as an objective
value, however, the court implicitly acknowledged an individual
right of the fetus. The importance of individual rights in the 1975
decision of the Constitutional Court is obvious from the language
the court used to justify the general priority of the unborn life over
the woman's right of personality. The balance of competing
individual rights or values dominates the court's reasons for the
constitutionality of specific exemptions from the general prohibi-
tion of abortion. The 1993 decision of the Constitutional Court
increased the importance of the role of individual rights in the
design of German abortion law.
103. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerG, 39 BVerfGE 1, 49 (F.R.G.).
104. Id. at 46.
105. See Mattern, supra note 66, at 666. Cf 39 BVerfGE at 65-66. The court stated
that if the government did not declare abortion to be criminal other than in exceptional
situations, the general consciousness would not perceive it as wrong or anti-social. Id.
106. 39 BverfGE at 41.
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B. The Constitutional Court's 1993 Decision on Abortion
The Constitutional Court's 1993 decision resulted from the
need to reconcile, after German reunification, the liberal East
German abortion law with the rather conservative West German
abortion regulation. The following subsections highlight the
process that led to the court's ruling in 1993 and elaborate on the
reasoning of that decision.
1. Regulation of Abortion after German Unification
On October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic (GDR
or East Germany) transformed itself into five Lander,"7 acceded
to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany), and
ceased to exist. The Einigungsvertrag. (Treaty for the Creation of
German Unity), ratified by the Bundestag and the Volkskammer
(the East German Parliament) designated the Grundgesetz as the
constitution of all of Germany.tO'
Although the Bundestag added a new section to the Basic Law
to allow parts of the East German law to temporarily remain in
effect,'09 forty-two years of separation" ° prompted historians
and lawyers to doubt the feasibility of merging two different
societies by the general adoption of West German law in the
Eastern Lander.'"
One important issue during the negotiation of the Unification
Treaty was abortion."' The negotiations on abortion law, which
107. These are Saxony, Thuringia, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg,
Saxony-Anhalt, and the City of Berlin. Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity,
Aug. 31,1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., art. 1, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 457,464 [hereinafter Unification
Treaty].
108. Unification Treaty, art. 3, supra note 107, at 464.
109. Article 143 Grundgesetz reads:
(I) Law [in the former East Germany] may deviate from provisions of the Basic
Law for a period not extending beyond 31 December 1992 in so far and as long
as no complete adjustment to the order of the Basic Law can be achieved as a
consequence of the different conditions ... ; (II) Deviations from sections II,
VIII... not extending beyond 31 December 1998.
Id. at 465.
110. According to the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, Germany was under the "supreme
authority" of the Allies. The four-power Allied Control Council exercised this authority.
The Soviet Union's withdrawal in 1948 introduced the division of Germany, which was
completed with the foundations of two separate states in 1949. See Mattern, supra note 66,
at 644 n.5.
111. Kapo, supra note 33, at 139.
112. Id.
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almost delayed reunification, lasted until the morning of the day
the treaty was scheduled to be signed."3  The need for
negotiations resulted from the fundamental differences between the
liberal abortion provisions in the GDR and the rather conservative
regulations in the FRG.
In the end, the treaty assigned an all-German parliament, to
be elected in the unified Republic, the task of passing a new all-
German law on abortion by December 31, 1992. Otherwise, the
substantive East German abortion law would continue to be in
effect.'14
2. The Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1992
The conservative-liberal coalition (CDU-CSU-FDP)"5 gained
the majority of votes in the elections for the first all-German
parliament on December 2, 1990. " 6 The abortion question,
however, transcended coalition lines. Each political party repre-
sented in the Bundestag forwarded its own proposal.'I The
proposals varied from total restriction of abortion except for
serious medical reasons (Bavarian Christian Social Union) to
complete repeal of all penalties for termination (Greens and the
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS))." 8
The Social Democratic Party (SPD), as the main opposition
party, and the FDP, as the junior partner of the ruling coalition,
covered the middle ground. After intensive negotiations, these two
parties presented the Gruppenantrag (group proposal), which
contained an omnibus statute that would amend the penalty law
and the public law."9
The group proposal attracted not only the votes of the Social
Democrats and the Liberals but also the votes of East German
Christian Democrats. 2 Contrary to the usual practice of voting
113. WOLFGANG SCHAUBLE, DER VERTAG 246-52 (1993).
114. Unification Treaty, supra n ote 107, art. 31, § 4. The latter provision was to ensure
that the CDU played an active role rather than waiting for a time limit to expire. After
that, the West German law would be adopted for all-Germany. Id.
115. The CDU were the Christian Democratic Union. The CSU stood for Bavaria's
Christian Social Union. Kommers, supra note 33, at 4 n.13. The FDP party stood for Free
Democratic Party. Id. at 12.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 12 n.53.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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along party lines, where members are not legally obliged but
strongly encouraged to vote along the lines of their coalition
(Fraktionszwang), voting this time was released from the
constraints of party discipline. The Assistance Act passed the
Bundestag with 357 to 283 votes,' with twenty members of the
CDU voting in favor of the new law."
The Assistance Act amended sections 218 through 219 of the
German Civil Code, Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), and "cut the heart out
of the Abortion Reform Act of 1976."'2 Abortion, in principle,
remained a criminal offense. 4 The provisions introduced by
§ 218a StGB, however, legalized abortion in some circumstances,
including "medical," "eugenic," and "criminological" indica-
tions.' 5
While these exemptions existed prior to 1992, the most
important amendment concerned the "social indication" regulated
in subparagraph 1 of the new § 218a StGB:
The termination of pregnancy is not unlawful, if:
1. the pregnant woman requests the abortion and satisfies the
doctor, by means of a certificate in accordance with
Paragraph 219 subparagraph 3, sentence 2, that she has
allowed herself to be advised at least three days before the
operation (advice to the pregnant woman in a crisis or
conflict situation),
2. the abortion is carried out by a doctor, and
3. not more than twelve weeks have elapsed since concep-
tion. 26
The crucial difference from the West German abortion law of
1976 was that the Assistance Act left the final decision of whether
to have an abortion to the woman. The solution presented also
differed from the East German model. A woman could not obtain
an abortion on demand but had to listen to the advice of a
physician-counselor. The Assistance Act obliged the counselors to
stress the value of the unborn life and to encourage the woman to
121. Id.; see also Miedel, supra note 40, at 486.
122. See Miedel, supra note 40, at 487.
123. Kommers, supra note 33, at 13.
124. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] § 218 (as cited in Judgment of May 28, 1993, BVerfG, 88
BVerfGE 203, 215 (F.R.G.)).
125. Id.
126. Samuel K.N. Blay & Ryszard W. Piotroweiz, The Advance of German Unification
and the Abortion Debate, 14 STATUTE L. REV. 171, 181 (1993).
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make her own responsible and conscientious decision."2 Coun-
selors also had to provide detailed medical, social, and legal
information, including advice on legal entitlements and the
availability of practical assistance designed to help in situations of
distress. ' 28
Consequently, the Assistance Act embodied a package of
socio-economic measures dealing with child support, medical
insurance, social security, job placement, and vocational
training.'29 The Assistance Act, for example, would entitle
children to day care so that their mothers could pursue careers. 3t
Most importantly, the drafters of the Assistance Act paid
special attention to the 1975 decision of the Constitutional Court.
The drafters intended the Assistance Act, in content and language,
to ensure better protection of the unborn life. Its design did not
question the duty of the state to protect the fetus. In 1975, the
Constitutional Court ruled that the sum of legal measures, whether
criminal or civil, is the decisive factor that determines if the fetus
is adequately protected.' 3' Furthermore, employing the argument
that criminal measures had not achieved their goal in West
Germany during the last sixteen years,'3 2 the omnibus bill
provided a considerable package of supporting social measures to
encourage the women to bring their pregnancies to term.
In the view of the general public, the legislators made an
honest effort to take into account both the requirements of the
Basic Law, as shaped by the Constitutional Court's 1975 judgment,
and the spirit of Article 31, § 4, of the Unification Treaty, which
called for a "better solution" to the problem of pregnant women
in distress "than is the case in either part of Germany at
present."' 33  The provisions of the Assistance Act reasonably
reflected the social reality and represented a promising attempt to
127. Id. at 181-82.
128. Id.
129. See Kommers, supra note 33, at 13.
130. The court declared that "[t]he legislature [must) provide the basis for a balance
between family activities and gainful employment and guarantee that the task of raising
children in a family will not lead to any disadvantage in the workplace." Id. at 21 (quoting
Judgment of May 28, 1993, BVerfG, 88 BVerfGE 203, 260 (F.R.G.)).
131. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerG, 39 BVerfGE 1, 46 (F.R.G.).
132. Cf Mattern, supra note 66, at 685 (empirical studies of West Germany indicate that
abortion rates are higher than other countries with more liberal abortion laws).
133. See Kommers, supra note 33, at 13 (quoting Unification Treaty, supra note 107, art.
31, § 4).
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reconcile the differences between West and East with respect to
abortion law.
3. The 1993 Judgment
The Assistance Act, passed on June 26, 1992, never went into
effect. Backed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 249 Christian
Democratic members of Parliament, exclusively West Germans,
petitioned the Constitutional Court to issue an injunction to enjoin
the enforcement of the Assistance Act." The Bavarian.govern-
ment filed a separate petition.135 On August 4, 1992, the court
unanimously ordered the injunction.
136
After hearings in December 1992, the Second Senate of the
Constitutional Court, in a 6-2 vote, declared major provisions of
the Assistance Act unconstitutional and void on May 28, 1993.137
Balancing the competing individual rights, the judges this time paid
more attention to a woman's personality rights. The main
argument of the lengthy decision,' however, focused on two
words of the Assistance Act: nicht rechtswidrig (not illegal).
a. The "Illegal" but "Unsanctioned" Abortion
The Constitutional Court's reasoning in the 1993 decision
began with a confirmati6n of the 1975 judgment:139 the unborn
life is a constitutional value protected by Article 2, sentence 1, in
conjunction with Article 1 of the Basic Law. The state is responsi-
ble for ensuring this protection.'o The infringed right of a
woman to self-determination generally does not exempt the
pregnant woman from the legal duty to carry the fetus to term:
"Basic rights of the woman do not exempt from the general
prohibition of abortion. These rights also exist against the right to
life of the nasciturus and are to be protected. However, they do
not exempt from the legal duty to bring the pregnancy to
134. Id. at 15.
135. Id.
136. Judgment of Aug. 4, 1992, BverfG, 86 BVerfGE 390, 393 (F.R.G.).
137. Judgment of May 28, 1993, BVerG, 88 BVerfGE 203, 208-13 (F.R.G.).
138. Volume 88 of the Federal Constitutional Court Decisions Anthology (BVerfGE)
contains 163 pages.
139. See 88 BVerfGE at 251. The Court was not bound by its 1975 decision. The re-
interpretation of Article 2 of the Basic Lav, however, which was at the core of the 1975
ruling, could not be expected from a court that admitted to the rule of law and the concept
of continuity of law.
140. See 88 BVerfGE at 251f.
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term... in general."''
According to the hierarchy of objective values embodied in the
Basic Law, a woman's right to free development of her personality
must yield to the right to life of the fetus.' 2 As in 1975, the
court balanced the right of a woman to self determination against
the fetus's right to life. This time, however, the court emphasized
that the unborn life is not only protected as an objective value but
also as an individual right. "The obligation to protect the unborn
life is not only related to the [unborn] life in general but to the
individual life.'
143
Unlike the 1975 decision, the 1993 decision did not use the
terms "unborn life" or "gestating life" exclusively but referred to
the right of the fetus to life: "This right to life, which is not given
to the nasciturus through acceptance by his mother but is granted
to the unborn solely because of its existence, is the most elementa-
ry... right that departs from the dignity of man."'" Thus, the
court explicitly considered the individual rights of the fetus.
Confirming the exceptions of "criminological," "medical," and
"eugenic" indications, the court argued that an abortion for a
"social indication" could only be justified in cases of serious
distress, where it would be unreasonable to expect the woman to
carry the'fetus to term 45
As the court further explained, the new § 218a(1) StGB did
not define conditions of such Unzumutbarkeit (unreasonable
expectation). 46 The state must assess these conditions rather
than treat abortion as equal to childbirth. The Second Senate
found the language of § 218a(1) StGB, which described the
voluntary interruption of pregnancy within the first three months
as "not illegal," irreconcilable with the obligation of the state to
protect the unborn life.47 Consequently, the court declared the
provision void.
The social reality of 1993, however, differed from that of 1975.
Since 1972, East German women had free access to abortion while
the West German abortion practice was, characterized by an
141. Id. at 255.
142. Id. at 253.
143. Id. at 252.
144. Id. See also id. at 255 (recognizing "the right to life of the nasciturus").
145. Id. at 256.
146. Id. at 256, 274.
147. Id. at 299. See also, Kommers, supra note 33, at 17.
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extensive utilization of the "social indication" justification and
abortion. tourism."' The unconstitutional Assistance Act's
provisions reflected both abortion practice in West Germany and
the liberal East German abortion law. Thus, after the court had
reconfirmed the constitutional principles established in the 1975
decision, the judges had to reconcile their legal standpoint with the
social reality that demanded the easing of abortion restrictions.1
49
The court solved the problem by using the "backdoor"
provided in the 1975 ruling on abortion. The court had held that
the state might express general legal disapproval of abortion in
ways other than through criminal punishment.5 As mentioned
above, the court considered the totality of legal measures as the
decisive factor in determining whether the unborn life was
sufficiently protected.'
The court, therefore, adopted the concept of "preventive
protection [of the unborn life] through counseling."'" It ruled
that the high constitutional value of the unborn life requires the
legislature to clarify that abortion, as a matter of principle, is
illegal.'53 An efficient Beratungskonzept (counseling concept)
that aims at the better protection of the fetus, on the other hand,
may require waiving any penalty for abortion." Hence, with a
counseling concept, all abortions not justified by one of the
acknowledged indications described above must remain "illegal"
but can be exempted from criminal punishment at the same time. 55
148. See GDR Law on the Interruption of Pregnancy of March 9, 1972; Eser, supra note
62, at 381. Abortion tourism was a response to limitations that forced a woman to seek.
abortions abroad. Id. at 377.
149. Kommers, supra note 33, at 19. Attitudes towards abortion had changed in West
Germany. Public opinion polls indicated that West Germans were in favor of easing restric-
tions. Furthermore, in East Germany, women could obtain abortions on demand. Id.
150. See Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975, BVerG, 39 BverfGE 1 (F.R.G.).
151. Id. at 4-6.
152. Judgment of May 28, 1993, BVerG, 88 BVerfGE 203, 281 (F.R.G.).
153. Id. at 273.
154. Id. at 300.
155. The typical German analysis of a crime includes the following steps:
a) illegal action (Tatbestand): analysis of the action as such on an objective (killing
of the fetus or a person) and subjective level (intent to kill);
b) illegality (Rechtswidrigkeit): the act is illegal if there is no justification (e.g.,
medical indication or self defense) exist;
c) personal guilt (Schuld): special circumstances (e.g., irresponsibility or insanity)
may exclude personal guilt; and
d) punishment (Strafe): if (a) through (c) are fulfilled, punishment is the rule;
however, a penalty might not be imposed in exceptional cases (e.g., the drunk
5951996]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
b. The Constitutional "Counseling Concept"
The Constitutional Court found that to replace the indication
solution with the periodic model (which leaves the final decision on
abortion to the woman), the counseling concept as a middle ground
must be subject to stringent constitutional standards."6 The
underlying idea of the counseling concept, based on the limitations
of criminal law in preventing abortions, is to make. the pregnant
woman an ally rather than impose the threat of punishment."s
The purpose of counseling would be defeated if the woman had to
carry the burden of proof regarding the severity of her social
predicament.'58  Preventive protection through counseling,
however, must be oriented actively toward the constitutional goal
of-protecting the unborn life.'59 Although counseling had central
importance within the framework of the Assistance Act, merely
encouraging the expectant mother to make her own responsible
and conscientious decision was insufficient to meet the
constitutional standards to protect the fetus."6  Thus, the
Constitutional Court declared the corresponding counseling
provision of the Assistance Act (§ 219 StGB) void. 6'
The court argued that the requirement of effective counseling
obliges the state to provide support that enables the woman not
only to give birth to the child but also to raise it while retaining
her right to free development of her personality in a career:
"[T]he state and especially the legislature has the duty to provide
the basis for a balance between family activities and gainful
employment, for the guarantee that the task to educate the
children in a family does not lead to any disadvantage in the
workplace."' 62
In other words, the court explicitly emphasized the woman's
individual right to self-development, which is affected by carrying
driver is disabled for life and lost his family in the accident).
Thus, the legalistic distinction between illegality and punishment allows the construction
of "illegal" but "unpunished" abortion. Kommers, supra note 33, at 18.
156. See 88 BVerfGE at 281f.
157. See Kommers, supra note 33, at 20.
158. 88 BVerfGE at 281.
159. Id. at 282.
160. Cf Id. at 306f. Counseling should be open ended as to the result and goal, but
must be oriented toward protecting the life of the unborn.
161. Id. at 208, 270.
162. Id. at 260.
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a pregnancy to term. Thus, the state would be obliged to compen-
sate the woman for the sacrifices of motherhood. The woman is
entitled to positive action by the state because she possesses an
individual right to freely determine her future as guaranteed in
Article 2(1) of the Basic Law. Glendon argued that, in Germany,
"what the pregnant woman can be required to sacrifice for the
common value is related to what the social welfare state is ready
and able to do to help with the burdens of childbirth and parent-
hood."' 6 She failed to mention, however, that the source of this
assistance was rooted in an individual's right against the state.
Again, the German solution welcomed by Glendon finds its basis
in rights talk rather than the common good.
The court required the Parliament to review the relevant
provisions of the Assistance Act and to consider the present and
the future living conditions of pregnant women and their families.
The Second Senate proceeded to suggest private and public legal
measures, including amending consumer credit laws to ensure job
security in the aftermath of childbirth, and, to ease the financial
burdens on families.'" These measures extended beyond the
provisions of the Assistance Act.
Altogether, the Constitutional Court accepted the
constitutionality of the counseling concept if backed by an
extensive social policy."c Similar to its approach in 1975, the
court ordered an interim regulation consistent with its 1993
ruling.
66
C. The Importance of Rights Talk in the German Decisions
The 1975 Constitutional Court decision and Roe v. Wade
differed because the U.S. Supreme Court placed too little emphasis
on individual rights. The decisive issue in Roe was the question of
who possessed the individual rights. In contrast, the recognition in
the German decision of the fetus' right to life as a value that the
Basic Law protects, created the need for rights talk that required
balancing competing interests. Because the structure of German
constitutionalism allowed the Constitutional Court to protect the
163. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 39.
164. 88 BverfGE at 260-61.
165. The court addressed further important questions such as the abortion funding
under the gesetzliche Krankenversicherung (state's medical insurance system). An
assessment of these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
166. 88 BverfGE at 209.
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potential human being within an objective hierarchy of values, the
explicit notion of an individual right of the fetus was not necessary.
The 1975 German decision, however, was determined not by the
superiority of common values to the woman's individual right but
rather by the priority of life over rights to freedom of personality.
Finally, both the 1993 German Constitutional Court and the
U.S. Supreme Court in Roe and Casey defined rights in terms of
individuals. Both struck down laws in order to protect rights that
belonged to individuals: the fetus in the German case and the
woman in Roe. Furthermore, the German court explicitly required
the state to address fully the problem of the woman's individual
right to free development. It required that the woman be
compensated for the imposition of a legal duty upon her to bring
a pregnancy to term. 67 Hence, the competition between individ-
ual rights in the German decisions prevented the court from
creating a right to abortion similar to Roe and allowed for intensive
balancing of competing rights.
V. CONVERGENCE OF ABORTION REGULATION IN GERMANY
AND THE UNITED STATES
A comparison of the German and the U.S. abortion decisions
is of special interest because "two occidental post-industrial, secular
societies, presumably conunitted to liberty and justice for all, have
embraced, at least temporarily, radically different constitutional
positions on abortion."1" In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied individual rights to the fetus, whereas the 1975 German
court sought to protect fetal life. Women in the United States
could decide for themselves whether or not to carry a pregnancy
to term, while abortion in Germany was only legal under certain
conditions. Almost twenty years later, both courts preserved the
core of their original decisions. Casey did not overrule Roe's
priority of the woman's right to privacy; abortion before viability
remained the woman's choice. The 1993 judgment of the German
court expressly confirmed the 1975 ruling: the woman's right to
free development of her personality still must yield to the fetus'
right to life. The validity of the different constitutional positions
taken in the 1970s seemed to be preserved. Without the technical
legal language, however, Casey and the 1993 German decision
167. Id. at 261.
168. Kommers, supra note 33, at 2.
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represent a convergence on the abortion question.
Roe and Casey, as well as the 1993 German court ruling, left
the final decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy to the
woman. The system of "preventive protection [of the unborn life]
through counseling"'69 leaves the general principle of abortion's
illegality intact but allows the state to withhold punishment for
abortions obtained during the first trimester of pregnancy. The"
counseling procedure must actively promote the value of unborn
life and must encourage the woman to give birth to the child.
After hearing the arguments of the state, however, the woman
ultimately makes the final decision about abortion. 7
The legal positions of U.S. and German women may be
separated, for example, by utilizing Hohfeld's conception of judicial
reasoning.' Hohfeld argues for a differentiation among rights,
duties, immunity and privileges. Defining privileges as one's
freedom from the right or claim of another, he describes immunity
as "one's freedom from the legal power or 'control' of another
regarding some legal relation.""' Thus, while Roe and Casey
recognized a woman's privilege to remain free from the state's
interference in abortion decisions, the 1993 German decision
granted immunity from the legal power of the state in its applica-
tion of the penalty law to satisfy its obligation to protect unborn
life. The differentiation between immunity and privilege, however,
is a technical one and does not affect the practical similarities of
abortion regulation in Germany and the United States. Both U.S.
and German women make the final choice about their pregnancy.
In addition, the constitutional counseling procedure as defined
by the German court appears to serve the same goal as the
Pennsylvania law at issue in Casey. The German court required
that the counseling must actively serve the goal of protecting
unborn life. The Casey court permitted the state to promote its
interest in childbirth by requiring that it provide a woman seeking
an abortion with information about available social assistance.
Thus, in practice, women in Germany and Pennsylvania must listen
to advice favoring childbirth before they can obtain a legal
169. 88 BverfGE at 282.
170. Id.
171. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16 (1913).-
172. Id at 30-32.
173. Id. at 55.
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abortion. In both procedures, the counseling must not hinder the
woman's final choice: in the United States, the woman has the
privilege to be free from undue burdens by the state in her right to
decide about abortion; in Germany, because the core of the
German concept of prevention by counseling is to make the
woman an ally in protecting the unborn life, it emphasizes an
informed but unhindered decision.
74  ,
The main difference in the abortion decisions of the 1990s is
that abortion throughout pregnancy is still illegal in Germany. This
principal decision will attract Glendon's applause because she
believes the moral stand against abortion will serve an educational
role that makes for a difference in abortion practice.
The record of abortion practice in Germany after the court's
restrictive 1975 decision suggests the existence of a dichotomy
between legal theory and practice. The development of abortion
practice in West Germany after 1975-76 was characterized by high
numbers of legal terminations and decreasing convictions. The
total number of abortions reported in Germany from 1976 to 1989
is as follows:
Year Number of Abortions
1970 4,882
1974 17,814
1977 54,309
1978 73,548
1982 91,000
1988 83,784
t75
Abortions performed from 1974 to 1977 increased because
social indications gained increasing importance. In 1977, social
indications counted for fifty-seven percent of all legal abortions,
whereas by 1982 the percentage had risen to seventy-seven
174. See 88 BVerfGE at 281.
175. For 1970-82 data, see Eser, supra note 62, at 381-82. For 1977-78 data, see
Bundestags Drucksache 8/3630. For 1983-89 data, see ULRICH VULTEJUS, DAS URTEIL
VON MEMMINGEN: VOM ELEND DER INDIKATION 11 (1990).
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percent.76 Not every abortion, however, was reported. Esti-
mates of actual abortions performed in Germany in 1989 vary from
130,000 to 400,000.17 Many pregnant women obtained abortions
in other Western European countries with more liberal laws.
Obviously, a demand for abortion services existed in German
society despite the pronouncements of the Constitutional Court.
This demand proved to be relatively independent from the legal
prohibition of abortion. After the court's 1993 ruling, this demand
is likely to be satisfied by the ability to obtain an illegal but
unpunished abortion. Furthermore, the distinction between
"illegality" of a crime and its punishment represents a concept
lawyers have difficulty understanding. This is more true for the
average citizen. How illegal is an abortion that goes unpunished
not only in exceptional cases but in principle? The illegality of
abortion, stressed by the Constitutional Court, may be transformed
in reality into an empty legalistic shell. As Laurence Tribe put it:
[The] codification of a truly empty promise, one whose vision is
belied by the people's day-to-day experience, one that is utterly
at variance with the substance of the law in which it is con-
tained, can take an unacceptably high toll on confidence in the
rule of law and in the integrity of the legal system as a
whole.7 8
In summary, the main difference between the U.S. and
German approaches to abortion is actually a technical rather than
practical one. Thus, the decisions of both the German
Constitutional Court and the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1990s
represent converging approaches to regulating abortion. The
counseling concept accepted by the German court will allow for an
availability of abortions obtained in Germany that reflects the real
demand for that service. By approving counseling procedures, the
Casey court allowed the states to protect the common value of
unborn life to an extent that equals the constitutional requirements
set forth by the German court in 1993. As the German legislators
try to liberalize abortion as far as possible, U.S. states, such as
Pennsylvania, attempt to restrict the availability of abortion.
Similarities, rather than differences, in abortion regulations and
practice are likely in the future.
176. See Eser, supra note 62, at 381.
177. See VULTEJus, supra note 175, at 11.
178. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 73-74 (1992).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Glendon's criticism of the U.S. legal dispute overemphasizes
the existence of individualism as the leitmotif of U.S. abortion law.
The language of Roe and Casey did not neglect the value of the
unborn life because the Supreme Court recognized the state's
interest in protecting it. Furthermore, all of the laws at issue in the
Court's abortion decisions sought to protect the nasciturus. Thus,
U.S. society is not merely rights-centered but also is aware of the
common good of fetal life.
Glendon's preference for unborn life as a public value over the
woman's individual freedom leads her to conclude that the German
approach to regulating abortion is superior. In Glendon's view, the
Constitutional Court's 1975 decision represents a conscious value
judgment that favors communitarian values rather than individual
rights. Glendon, however, ignores the fact that the protection of
the nasciturus in the German decision did not depend on the
classification of unborn life as a common good, but rather, on the
general priority of life over the right of personality in the German
Basic Law. The recognition of fetal life as a communitarian value
necessarily implies an individual right to life of the particular
nasciturus. Thus, the existence of rights and a more intensive
rights talk in the German decision allowed for a balanced judgment
in favor of unborn life. Glendon's "rights talk" argument therefore
overlooks the reason for the emphasis on the woman's right to
privacy in the U.S. abortion decisions in the 1970s.
With respect to Casey and the German court's 1993 judgment,
the crucial difference remaining is the German law's priority of
unborn life over the woman's right of personality. The empirical
evidence of a dichotomy between the letter of the law and abortion
practice in Germany in the aftermath of the 1975 ruling of the
court, however, indicates that the construction of illegal but
unpunished abortion by the court in 1993 is likely to fail to
communicate its difficult messhge.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Casey permitted what in 1993
the German court required the state to do to protect unborn life.
Thus, the convergence rather than radical difference of abortion
regulations as reflected in Glendon's Rights Talk is likely to be the
central feature of the future development of abortion law in the
United States and Germany.
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